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ABSTRACT
The implementation of marine protected areas, such as marine reserves and customary fishing areas, is
considered an important step toward advancing ecosystem-based management (EBM), but has proven
difficult due to resistance from well-organized fishing interests. This raises the question of how the values
of less well-organised parties can be brought into the political decision-making process. We summarise the
results of a discrete choice survey of the general public in New Zealand that elicits willingness to make trade-
offs among taxes and four socio-ecological attributes: biodiversity, maintenance of Maori customary prac-
tices, and restrictions on commercial and recreational fishing. We apply cluster analysis, which provides in-
formation about political ‘market shares’ of respondent preferences, and derive estimates of average public
willingness to pay for various policy scenarios. Both analyses reveal broad-scale support for conservation of
biodiversity and cultural practices, providing quantifiable input from the public in the process of marine
space reallocation.
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INTRODUCTION
Unregulated access to a scarce resource, such as a marine fishery, often leads to its inefficient
use. Hardin’s metaphor of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) and Gordon’s analy-
sis of an “open-access fishery” (Gordon 1954) expose the fundamental causes. Unrestricted
access to harvest leads to economic inefficiency as each individual fisher lacks incentive to
respond to low fish stock levels or damage to the marine ecosystem, subsequently lowering
future economic returns. Most recent efforts to manage marine areas have focussed on im-
proving or maintaining commercial returns from fishing. Fisheries management is, however,
evolving from regulatory controls on fishing inputs and outputs, to a more holistic approach,
known previously as ecosystem management (Grumbine 1994) and more recently as ecosystem-
based management (EBM) (Curtin and Prellezo 2010). The goal of EBM is not only to take into
account the effects of fishing on the broader ecosystem, and vice versa, but also to consider the
broader range of human interactions with the ecosystem, including, for example, maintenance
of customary practices, tourism, and public non-use values.
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Implementation of EBM has, however, been slow (e.g., Garcia and Cochrane 2005; Arkema,
Abramson, and Dewsbury 2006; Curtin and Prellezo 2010). One could argue that achiev-
ing sustainable socio-ecological systems requires a “seismic shift in the mind-set of humans”
(Grumbine 1994). Such a large shift may have to occur through incremental changes in policy.
One option is to extend practices already established on land to marine areas. Protection of
biodiversity is a critical part of EBM, and networks of protected marine areas could be built
around a system of core marine reserves and buffer zones connected by habitat corridors
(Grumbine 1994; Macleod, Lynch, and Hoagland 2009). Marine space could also be allocated
to maintain sustainable social interactions with the marine environment, such as longstand-
ing traditional or customary uses. The implementation of such spatial zoning to implement
these various management tools within a framework of marine protected areas (MPAs) or,
more broadly, Biosphere Reserves that take the interests of multiple stakeholders into ac-
count, has been credited with playing a crucial role in putting the EBM concept into practice
(Bridgewater 2002; Douvere 2008; Angulo-Valdés and Hatcher 2010).
However, establishing MPAs has often proven difficult due to opposition from well-
organized incumbent fishing interests (e.g., Wolfenden, Cram, and Kirkwood 1994; Suman,
Shivlani, and Milon 1999; Taylor and Buckenham 2003; Grafton, Kompas, and Schneider
2005). This raises the question of how the political process can be influenced to continue to
work toward economic efficiency on a broader scale; i.e., one that includes the values of in-
terested parties in addition to commercial and recreational fishers. Large-scale nationally or
regionally representative surveys offer the opportunity to canvas the preferences of the gen-
eral public. Non-market valuation techniques allow the expression of those preferences in mon-
etary terms, which is useful both politically and from a cost-benefit perspective.
In this article, we summarise the previously reported results of a discrete choice survey
of the general public in New Zealand that elicits stakeholder preferences to make tradeoffs
among changes in taxes and four socioecological attributes: biodiversity, maintenance of
Māori customary cultural practices, and restrictions on commercial and recreational fishing
in nearshore marine areas. We extend the analysis by exploring the heterogeneity in prefer-
ences across respondents. Specifically, we use cluster analysis of individual respondent pref-
erences to distinguish those with a relatively strong preference for each of the four socio-
ecological attributes, essentially providing information about political ‘market shares.’ The
analysis shows that the cluster of respondents who value biodiversity quite highly is at least
twice as large as any other group, though commercial and recreational fishers together also
form a relatively large group. We also estimate average public willingness to pay (WTP) for
various policy scenarios (useful in cost-benefit analysis), revealing public willingness to fi-
nancially support ecosystem-based policies that focus on conservation of biodiversity and
cultural practices.
The following section provides an overview of the evolution of fisheries management and
the problems associated with EBM implementation. We then describe the choice experiment
used to elicit the preferences of the general public, and the final section concludes the article.
THE EVOLUTION OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Wilen (2000) summarises the evolution of fisheries management. Input controls, such as
restrictions on the size and number of boats, types of equipment, and time allowed fishing,
were the earliest and most commonly used type of regulation. Controls on specific inputs,
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however, incentivise the expansion of inputs left unregulated (e.g., Pearse 1981), which raises
production costs and reduces fish stocks thereby dissipating resource rent (Gordon 1954;
Copes 1986; Wilen 2000). The inadequacy of input controls has, over time, motivated the
adoption of direct control over output in the form of quota management systems (QMS),
where individual rights to catch a pre-specified quantity of fish prior to harvest, more gener-
ally known as catch shares, eliminate the race for fish and allow fishers to concentrate on
minimising production costs and maximizing profit (Pearse 1981; Wilen 2000).
While comprehensive QMSs have been shown to halt and reverse declines in some com-
mercial fish stocks (Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008), problems associated with imple-
menting QMSs have been discussed extensively in the literature (e.g., Copes 1986; Clark and
Major 1988; Copes 1995; Symes and Crean 1995; Lock and Leslie 2007; Helson et al. 2010).
Increasingly, interest has focused on issues emanating from the incentive the QMS generates
to minimise production costs: bycatch of non-commercial species and damage to the wider
ecosystem, such as damage to habitat structures from trawling (Mangi and Roberts 2006;
Reiss et al. 2010). Ryan, Holland, and Herrera (2014) use a bioeconomic model to show how
such ecosystem externalities affect open-access equilibria and optimal fishing regulation, and
there is a growing literature on bioeconomic models of habitat-fisheries interactions (see
Foley et al. (2012) for an overview).
The issues of bycatch and ecosystem impacts of fishing have motivated the growing con-
sensus that sustaining marine resources requires management based on understanding the
effects of human actions on the entire ecosystem, rather than only target species (Grumbine
1994; Curtin and Prellezo 2010). The case for EBM rests on the complex interconnectedness
and interdependence of ecosystem components, which generally remain poorly understood.
Networks of MPAs are considered an important step toward advancing EBM by addressing
environmental effects and conflicts across resource users, as well as overlapping objectives
among stakeholders (Grumbine 1994; Douvere 2008). We focus here on two types of MPAs:
marine reserves (no-take areas) and customary management areas (CMAs).1
The benefits of marine reserves have been described extensively in the literature (see
Grafton, Kompas, and Schneider (2005) for an overview). The main ones include: (1) protect-
ing ecosystem structure and restoring overexploited stocks (e.g., Alcala and Russ 1990), (2) in-
creasing stocks outside the reserves (e.g., Roberts et al. 2001), and (3) potentially increasing
returns to fishing. See Grafton, Kompas, and Schneider (2005) for extensive discussion of
bioeconomic models of marine reserves, including deterministic models (e.g., Sanchirico and
Wilen 2001), spatial economic models (e.g., Smith and Wilen 2003), and uncertainty and
stochastic models (e.g., Hannesson 2002).
CMAs represent a form of marine protection based on “local practices that are designed
to regulate the use, access, and transfer of resources” (Cinner and Aswani 2007, 202). These
local practices include spatial, temporal, gear, effort, species, and catch restrictions, which
have been handed down through generations via cultural transmission (Walters and Holling
1990; Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2000; Berkes and Turner 2006; Turner and Berkes 2006;
Moller, Kitson, and Downs 2009). Compliance is relatively high (Cinner and Aswani 2007),
1. Marine parks, marine mammal sanctuaries, customary take areas, etc., all offer varying levels of protection and are
grouped under MPAs in this article as opposed to marine reserves, which are strictly no-take areas.
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and it is argued that social-ecological resilience is one of the key advantages of customary
management.2 A meta-analysis of common-pool resource case studies concludes that self-
organising local institutions often perform better than more remote governmental institutions
in managing common property, especially in settings where trust is established and institu-
tional rules have evolved that are well matched to the ecological systems being used (Ostrom
2010).
There has been a strong push toward adopting large-scale MPAs, primarily in terms of
marine reserves. Countries including Australia, Canada, China, the US, and several in Europe
have adopted management measures, such as marine spatial planning and zoning, as a start in
the process (Douvere 2008), but actual progress has been slow (Jones 2014).3 In New Zealand,
the government had committed to protecting 10% of the coast through its MPA policy by
2010; however, to date only 0.3% of its marine area is protected in marine reserves, and nearly
all of this protection is located offshore (Eddy 2014).
Part of the problem is technical: the designation of marine reserves and CMAs to imple-
ment EBM has been constrained by concerns about the limited knowledge of marine systems
and by the difficulties of matching the appropriate scale of society governance with that of
ecosystems (e.g., Garcia and Cochrane 2005; Curtin and Prellezo 2010).
Possibly the biggest part of the problem, however, is political; marine space has already
been allocated, explicitly or implicitly, to certain users of marine resources, usually commer-
cial and recreational fishing, and implementation of MPAs imposes additional costs on these
current resource users due to the loss of fishing opportunities. Smith et al. (2010), for exam-
ple, apply a bioeconomic model to isolate the economic factors that lead to opposition at the
time of marine reserve creation, focusing on how fishermen weigh short-term costs (which
depend on the availability of alternative fishing and non-fishing income) against uncertain
long-term gains in stock abundances outside reserves.
The potential cost implications of marine reserves have led to often passionate resistance
from the commercial fishing industry, and negotiations among stakeholders have been diffi-
cult (Halpern et al. 2008; Macleod, Lynch, and Hoagland 2009). As a practical matter, pub-
lic discussions are often strongly influenced by well-organised businesses and user groups
(Emerton 2003; Turner and Weninger 2005), and MPA restrictions are often rejected on the
basis of a “Not-In-My-Back-Yard” attitude (Wolfenden, Cram, and Kirkwood 1994; Sant
1996; Suman, Shivlani, and Milon 1999).
From society’s point of view, the decision to implement MPAs should be guided by a social
benefit-cost analysis (Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 2002). One way to influence the po-
litical process is to bring the views of other, less well-organised types of marine area users and
non-users into the debate. Indeed, non-use values that the general public hold toward preser-
vation of ecosystem integrity, biodiversity, and cultural practices may be a critical input into
the political process. National environmental agencies of the UK and other countries have
been working to employ cost-benefit analysis that includes a relatively broad spectrum of the
social costs and benefits associated with the reallocation of marine space (Hanley and Barbier
2. Resilience refers to the capacity of ecosystems to absorb recurrent natural and human perturbations and continue to
regenerate without slowly degrading or unexpectedly flipping into alternate states (Hughes et al. 2005; Gibbs 2009).
3. About 2% of marine areas are currently protected, compared to approximately 13% on land (Jones 2014).
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2009; TEEB 2010). Some costs and benefits are more difficult to measure than others. For ex-
ample, the costs of implementing a marine reserve or CMA to commercial fishing can be es-
timated using trends in market input and output prices, historical production data, and in-
formation from bio-economic models that capture the effect of redistributed fishing effort. In
contrast, the lack of credible values of intangible, and therefore non-marketed, benefits, such
as those from higher levels of biodiversity and traditional cultural practices, has been a barrier
to conservation because the lack of information about a value often leads to it being treated
effectively as ‘no value’ (TEEB 2010).
ELICITING PUBLIC PREFERENCES TO HELP MOVE EBM FORWARD
Estimating the values of a wide variety of public goods benefits associated with environmental
resources has become an important part of environmental economics. Aside from academic
interest, motivation for the development of non-market valuation techniques in natural re-
source settings has come from the need for plausible estimates of dollar damages to settle
lawsuits associated with environmental disasters and to fulfil regulatory requirements that
cost-benefit analyses be undertaken as part of public decision-making processes. There are
two broad approaches: (1) estimating values from related market data, such as house sales or
travel expenditures (revealed preference); and (2) recruiting people from a relevant popula-
tion to participate in a survey about their preferences (stated preference). Both methods have
strengths and weaknesses (see Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) and Bennett and Blamey
(2001) for a discussion), and the most appropriate method depends on the circumstances.
Jobstvogt, Watson, and Kenter (2014), for example, combine revealed preference (travel cost
survey) and stated preference (contingent valuation survey) methods to estimate both the use
and “stewardship” values of MPAs of both fisherman and divers in the UK.
One form of stated preference survey, discrete choice, is particularly useful for evaluating
alternative policy scenarios. Analysis of policies to manage marine areas requires consideration
of the various tradeoffs involved. Establishment of an MPA, for example, imposes costs in the
form of greater restrictions, usually on current users, such as commercial and recreational
fishers, to generate benefits to others, such as customary resource users who value the resource
both for harvest and for maintenance of traditional cultural practices, and/or the general pub-
lic who value protection of biodiversity as well as maintenance of current and customary
practices (existence values). Estimates of stakeholders’ willingness to trade off attributes allow
evaluation of each policy (defined in terms of attributes) relative to the others (Kiker et al.
2005; Linkov et al. 2006), and a single discrete choice survey can be designed to estimate the
values of the policy effects under consideration in monetary terms (Morrison, Bennett, and
Blamey 1998; Rolfe, Bennett, and Louviere 2000; Bennett and Blamey 2001; Mallawaarachchi
et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2007; Mansfield et al. 2008; Zander, Garnett, and Straton 2010).
A growing literature reports results of choice surveys to value biodiversity and ecosystem
services. Many studies apply to a terrestrial context (e.g., Dachary-Bernard and Rivaud 2013;
Mallawaarachchi et al. 2001; Mansfield et al. 2008; Rolfe, Bennett, and Louviere 2000; Wang
et al. 2007), but a growing number of studies addresses issues in a freshwater or marine
context (e.g., Birol, Karousakis, and Koundouri 2006; Groeneveld 2011; Hynes, Tinch, and
Hanley 2013; Wielgus et al. 2009). Of particular relevance to this study, McVittie and Moran
(2010), Groeneveld (2011), Börger et al. (2014) implement choice experiments to examine
preferences for various types of restrictions on fishing for biodiversity benefits in northern
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European fisheries. Jobstvogt et al. (2014) estimate both existence and option values of deep-
sea biodiversity, and Zander, Garnett, and Straton (2010) include culture as an attribute in
their survey that focused on improvements in the water quality of a river system in Australia.
No such survey has been applied to the New Zealand marine context. We recently imple-
mented a discrete choice survey of the general public in New Zealand that elicits willing-
ness to make tradeoffs among biodiversity, maintenance of customary cultural practices, and
restrictions on commercial and recreational fishing in nearshore marine areas. The method
used to implement the survey allows unusually close attention to the heterogeneity across
respondents in their willingness to make tradeoffs. The details of the survey and its imple-
mentation can be found in Chhun, Thorsnes, and Moller (2013). In this article, we summa-
rise the results and focus on their potential for influencing policy. We extend the analyses
reported in the previous paper in two ways. First, we report the results of a cluster analysis
of respondent preferences that reveals the relative sizes of groups with relatively strong pref-
erences for each of the attributes, essentially providing information about political ‘market
shares.’ Second, we report estimates of the public’s WTP through higher taxes for the out-
comes associated with several scenarios of relevance in New Zealand.
To summarise, the choice survey consisted of four socio-ecological attributes and one
‘price’ attribute: (1) health of the nearshore marine ecosystem (biodiversity), (2) maintenance
of Māori (customary) practices, (3) restrictions on recreational fishing, (4) restrictions on
commercial fishing, and (5) level of taxes paid by households. As shown in table 1, each of
the four socio-ecological attributes was defined on three levels, ranging from worst to best.
For example, for the attribute ‘restrictions on commercial fishing in the coastal area,’ the
level ‘not allowed anywhere’ corresponds to a ‘good’ condition of marine life (see first attri-
bute in table 1) but represents the worst outcome from the perspective of commercial fishers.
In contrast, the current relatively light controls on fishing (‘no change’) represent the best
outcome for commercial fishers, but correspond to a relatively ‘poor’ condition of marine life.
Table 1. Attributes and Levels (worst to best) used in the Choice Experiment
Attribute Levels
Condition of marine life
(number and variety) in
the coastal area
Poor (large drop in numbers and some species gone altogether)
Medium (some drop in numbers and some species might disappear)




No longer practiced anywhere
Practiced in partnership with locals in some locations




Many more restrictions (much lower bag limits and some locations closed)
More restrictions (lower bag limits and all locations open)





More restrictions (some locations closed and reduction in quota)
No change (allowed anywhere at the existing quota levels)
Your taxes
(e.g., annual property tax
or rent on your house)
Increase by $120 per year (i.e., $10 more per month)
Increase by $60 per year (i.e., $5 more per month)
Do not change
Fall by $60 per year (i.e., $5 less per month)
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Thus, the survey inquires generally about the respondent’s willingness to trade off, for exam-
ple, more restrictions on fishing in a nearby marine area for improvements in biodiversity or
for maintenance of Māori traditional cultural practices.
The survey was implemented using web-based decision analysis software called 1000Minds
(www.1000Minds.com), which is based on an algorithm with the acronym PAPRIKA.4 The
algorithm presents the respondent with a series of discrete choices, such as those shown
in figures 1 and 2. Each choice requires the respondent to trade off more of one attribute for
less of another, assuming all other attributes are the same. Comparing only two attributes at a
time makes the ranking exercise as simple as possible. There are 122 such pairs in this choice
survey, one of which is chosen at random to start the survey. When the respondent ranks a
choice pair, the algorithm automatically identifies and eliminates all other choice pairs whose
ranking is implied via transitivity. The process continues until all pairs that require a tradeoff
are ranked either explicitly by the respondent or implicitly via transitivity. The key advantage
of the PAPRIKA algorithm is that it minimises the number of explicit rankings needed (27,
on average, in this case) to compute the relative weight each respondent places on each level
of each attribute. The survey thus yields a complete set of relative weights (utilities) of each
level of each attribute for each respondent.
In addition to a variety of potential sources of bias in all stated preference surveys, the al-
gorithm has disadvantages as a result of tradeoffs in the design (Hansen and Ombler 2008).5
The very simple two-attribute ranking exercises require the assumption that each respon-
dent’s underlying utility function is strictly additive across attributes and levels, which elimi-
nates the possibility of interactions among attributes. In addition, minimizing the number of
explicit rankings by implicitly ranking pairs via transitivity raises the potential for bias from
ill-considered rankings. This, of course, is a concern in all choice surveys, and in this case
each ranking is relatively simple. Though the exercise yields a complete set of relative weights
for reach respondent, we focus on averages among groups, rather than individuals, to reduce
the impact of bias.
The choice survey was conducted by a market-research firm that operates an online re-
wards programme in New Zealand. About 5% of New Zealand adults actively participate in
the program. A demographically and regionally representative sample was invited to complete
the choice survey followed by a more standard demographic survey. The response was stron-
ger than expected, with 1,055 completed choice surveys, representing an approximately 60%
response rate. The characteristics of the sample were broadly representative of the population,
though people self-identifying as of Māori ethnicity were underrepresented. This group was
‘topped up,’ resulting in modest over-sampling of this group.
Table 2 reports the means of the relative weights on each level of each socio-ecological
attribute. The decision software scales the estimated utility weights so that the values of the
best outcome of each attribute sum to 100. There is some suggestion of diminishing marginal
utility moving from the worst to the best outcomes (e.g., the mean utility for biodiversity
4. Though relatively recently developed, 1000Minds has a significant track record in academic research. See https://
www.1000minds.com/academic/peer-reviewed-publications.
5. For example, bias from non-random or non-representative sampling, bias due to the hypothetical nature of the survey
questions, respondent fatigue leading to incorrect choices, unknown functional form of utility functions, and so on (e.g.,
Bennett and Blamey 2001; Hanley and Barbier 2009; Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000).
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increases by 16.3 from worst to medium and by 14.5 from medium to best). On average, the
sample respondents value preventing the level of biodiversity dropping from ‘best’ to ‘worst’
in a nearby marine area about twice as much as they value preserving a best-to-worst drop in
any other socio-ecological attribute. The mean values corresponding to the tax attribute in-
dicate that a tax increase of $180 (from $60 less than current to a $120 more) per annum
Figure 1. Screenshot of Tradeoff between Two Socio-ecological Attributes
Figure 2. Screenshot of Tradeoff between a Socio-ecological Attribute and Tax Payment
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reduces relative utility by less than a drop in biodiversity from best to worst, implying a WTP,
on average, to maintain biodiversity. Weighting to the demographic characteristics of the New
Zealand population has only minor effects on these mean scores.
Of potential interest from a political perspective are the proportions of the population that
have relatively strong preferences for each of the four socio-ecological attributes. Table 3
reports the results of a cluster analysis of individual respondent preferences. The first col-
umn of numbers shows the mean utility weights on the ‘best’ outcome of each of the socio-
ecological attributes rescaled to add to 100 in the absence of the tax attribute (their sizes
relative to each other remain unchanged from table 2). Each value shows the relative value
of improving that attribute from worst to best. To explore the variation in values across re-
spondents, we used a k-means clustering routine to sort respondents according to patterns
in the relative utility weights of the socio-ecological attributes. For example, cluster 1 consists
of respondents who value preservation of biodiversity highly (in terms of improvement from
worst to best), relative to maintenance of Māori cultural practices, and light restrictions on
recreational and commercial fishing. The other three clusters consist of respondents who
Table 2. Mean Relative Utility of Each Level of Each Attribute (n = 1055)
Attribute Levels (from low to high)
Mean Scaled
Utility Scores
Biodiversity Poor condition (Worst) 0
Medium condition (Medium) 16.3
Good condition (Best) 30.8
Māori cultural management No longer practiced (Worst) 0
Practiced in partnership with locals (Medium) 9.3
Practiced exclusively by Māori (Best) 13.4
Recreational fishing Many more restrictions (Worst) 0
More restrictions (Medium) 7.7
Current restrictions (Best) 14.1
Commercial fishing Not allowed (Worst) 0
More restrictions (Medium) 8.2
Current restrictions (Best) 13.1
Tax Increase $120 per annum (+$120) 0
Increase $60 per annum (+$60) 11.6
No change (+$0) 21.0
Decrease $60 per annum (–$60) 28.6
Table 3. Results of a Cluster Analysis
Mean
Means of Four-cluster Solution
1 2 3 4
Biodiversity 42.9 60.2 30.9 26.1 33.5
Maintenance of Māori practices 18.5 12.1 38.0 17.7 11.6
Restrictions on recreational fishing 20.1 15.5 14.6 37.5 17.8
Restrictions on commercial fishing 18.5 12.2 16.5 18.7 37.2
Respondents (%) 100 42.7 20.9 19.8 16.5
Note: Each number represents the relative value of an improvement in that attribute from worst to best.
Eliciting Public Preferences for Ecosystem-Based Management | 269
value each of the other attributes highly (in bold), respectively. Note in particular that the
group with a high value of biodiversity is at least twice as large as any other group and that
biodiversity is valued highly even in the other three groups. That said, commercial and rec-
reational fishers together form a relatively large group at 36.3%.
Adding consideration of respondents’ estimated willingness to trade off money, in the form
of higher taxes, for a better package of socioecological outcomes contributes to cost-benefit
analysis of the policies needed to obtain those outcomes. For each individual respondent,
we used the estimated values on the levels of the tax attribute to interpolate or extrapolate
(conservatively) dollar values of any changes in the socioecological attributes.6 These dollar
values can be used to conduct scenario analyses, where scenarios of interest are each defined
(admittedly roughly) by the levels of each of the attributes in the choice survey. Table 4
provides an example of a scenario analysis in the New Zealand context.
Scenario analysis requires definition of a reference case or status quo. In this case, the
assumption is that use of nearshore marine areas has effectively been allocated to fishers.
Restrictions on recreational and commercial fishing are in place mainly to protect target fish
stocks. From the fishers’ perspective, these light restrictions can be considered to be the best
policy outcome. The controls are, however, imperfect, and some legal fishing practices dam-
age the marine ecosystem, so the level of biodiversity in the base case is considered poor
(worst). Similarly, the status quo provides local Māori no influence in management of tradi-
tional fishing areas. Thus, in the base case, for the sake of demonstration, conditions for
fishers are best, but worst for other stakeholders.
Each of the four scenarios in table 4 trade additional restrictions on fishing for improve-
ments in other attributes. Consider scenarios 1 and 2. Both scenarios involve allocation of
nearshore marine areas of historical significance to management by local Māori. This pro-
vides the best opportunity for local Māori to maintain historical cultural practices and tradi-
tions, which has value both to Māori and, to a lesser extent, to the general public. Māori man-
agement will, however, most likely result in more restrictions on recreational and commercial
fishers. As a practical matter, political considerations likely limit these to a ‘medium’ level of re-
strictions.
The difference between scenarios 1 and 2 is the impact of Māori management on biodi-
versity. Estimates from the choice survey indicate a considerable net mean social benefit in
scenario 1, in which a ‘medium’ level of biodiversity is maintained under Māori manage-
ment. Monetizing this net benefit using information about respondents’ willingness to accept
higher taxes for improvements in socioecological outcomes indicates a mean annual WTP of
about NZ$130 per year for scenario 1; that level of tax increase would leave respondents, on
average, indifferent between the status quo and scenario 1. This amount could be aggregated
across the roughly two million households in New Zealand to obtain a total annual WTP.
However, if Māori management results in no improvement in biodiversity, the average dollar
benefit to the general public from maintaining Māori cultural practices just offsets the dollar
cost of harm to the more conventional fishing culture. This difference reflects the importance
of maintaining biodiversity to the survey sample.
6. Refer to Chhun (2014) for a detailed discussion of the estimated functional relationships between relative utility and
level of tax for each respondent, from which the WTP estimates have been derived.
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Scenarios 3 and 4 focus on restoration/maintenance of biodiversity. Doing so in these scenar-
ios involves imposition of stronger restrictions on fishing and less support for Māori cultural
practices. Scenario 4 produces the largest estimate of average net dollar benefit to our survey
respondents. This scenario is roughly consistent with a network of marine reserves embedded in
areas allocated to Māori customary management that is effective at maintaining biodiversity.
The restrictions on fishing are relatively high, but apparently worthwhile to respondents in this
sample. The estimated WTP higher taxes could provide revenues that might go toward mitigat-
ing the negative effects on fishers, such as through purchase of commercial quota and/or sup-
porting recreational fishing in other areas.
Of most interest is that scenarios 1 and 4 suggest that a change in policy toward EBM
could yield significant net values that the general public would be willing to pay for. The pub-
lic, to the extent represented by this sample, appear willing to trade restrictions on fishing for
conservation of both biodiversity and Māori cultural practices, with especially strong prefer-
ence for biodiversity conservation. Having estimates of intangible benefits comparable to tan-
gible benefits aids cost-benefit analysis and could potentially provide justification for realloca-
ting marine space to protect biodiversity and cultural practices. However, the extent to which
results such as these can influence decision making remains to be seen.
CONCLUSIONS
The discussion of fisheries policy has come a long way from its historical focus on the needs
of commercial fishers to one that seeks to accommodate the values and preferences of multi-
ple stakeholders, including perhaps both the use and non-use values of the public. Many
countries at least aspire to some form of EBM, but implementation of policies leading in that
direction has been stalled by difficulties in negotiation and insufficient political will to impose
costs on current users. Nevertheless, the general public, who represent the vast majority of
voters and are typically poorly organised in the context of political discussions, may have
sufficiently strong preferences for the outcomes of fisheries policy to matter. Discrete choice
experiments represent the state of the art in research that elicits these preferences. Bringing
the results of these experiments into the mainstream discussion may present one step toward
advancing EBM.
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